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Chapter Three

One Civilization among Many?
Academic Reflections on the West and the Rest

Daniel J. Mahoney

We live in an era that oscillates incoherently between a humanitarian ideolo
gy that is too anxious to assert the unity of the human race and a multicultural
dogmatism that too facilely denies those universal experiences and affirma
tions that connect man as man. We have largely lost the capacity to conjugate
the universal and particular—to affirm what is genuinely universal about
Western civilization while, at the same time, recognizing what in the West is
not readily capable of "universal" application and emulation. We are thus
poorly prepared for that "dialogue of cultures and civilizations" to which
Pope emeritus Benedict XVI has so suggestively called us, in large part,
because we have no idea what civilization is. We do not reflect enough on
that humane mixture of civility, self-restraint, self-government, and thought
ful inquiry that is civilization itself. The arduous moral and intellectual vir
tues that adom our humanity have become unthinking "values" produced by
local cultures. The dialogue that Benedict XVI points us to presupposes some
understanding of the relation between universal principles and particular
ways of life, we, on the other hand, rest content proclaiming the universality
of rights—without ground or foundation—and the radical particularity of
every culture and civilization. Most fundamentally, we have lost sight of the
primordial distinction between civilization and barbarism, the precondition
for affirming human dignity and for recognizing the choice-worthiness of
any civilization as such. How, then, are we to find our way? Where are we to
turn for wisdom?
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THE PLURAL WEST
To begin with, we need to recover a capacious sense of the "plural" and
dialectical character of the West. The West is not reducible to what the
Danish historian David Gress has aptly called the "New West"—the West of
science, human rights, and commerce. In many contemporary interpretations,
this New West traces its origms to the Enlightenment and is not dependent on
any "values" other than the "autonomy" of the individual. Here, the claims
that the moral contents of life—religion, tradition, family, art, philosophy,
and truth—make on us are all subordinated to freely chosen "consent." Sub
sequently, there is an impoverishment of the human world.
In a masterful work of political and intellectual history, From Plato to
NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents, Gress reminds us that the
New West is dialectically dependent upon the old Western synthesis that
brought together Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, and the spirit of independence
bequeathed by the Germanic tribes of northern Europe. This synthesis came
together by the year 1,000 and left a distinctly "libertarian" mark on western
civilization. The West was an essentially pluralistic civilization and could not
be reduced to a single dominant principle. This pluralism was a source of the
West's dynamism, its powerful protection against tyranny. Gress ably shows
that political liberty and the rich and varied spiritual aspirations of the West
are not reducible to an Enlightenment project that said adieu, once and for
all, to the Old West. The theoreticians of the New West were often fierce
critics of tradition and the broader inheritance of the West. But the best
among them, the theoreticians of moderate enlightenment such as Montes
quieu and Tocqueville, appreciated that the emerging world of liberal moder
nity cannot sustain itself without a firm grounding in a western inheritance
that keeps despotism at bay, safeguarding the moral contents of life, and
melding tradition and a questioning spirit in a manner that is unique to the
West.
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT
In contrast, the illusion of unadulterated Enlightenment is that the human
being "is the sovereign author of the human world." In that new understand
ing, autonomy and consent reign supreme and refuse to bow before the
contents of life. As the contemporary French political theorist Pierre Manent
has put it, the tendency of late modernity is to grant "exclusive legitimacy to
the principle of consent."
But as Manent has compellingly argued, there is something tyrannical
about submitting "all the aspects of the world to a single principle," even if
that principle is liberty. A regime of liberty depends on things outside it-
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self—the moral capital of the West as well as the territorial framework, the
nation or territorial democracy, that makes consent possible, that gives it
form and structure. As the British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton
has argued, the people who consent to govern in our modern democracies
already exist as a people within traditions and with commitments that are not
merely the product of consent. "We can make sense of the social contract
only on the assumption of some such precontractual 'we.'" A people must
exist as a people before a contract can bind them politically. Behind constitu
tion-making, however noble and necessary, behind the evocation of the
Rights of Man, lay an inherited or "providential" constitution that men do not
simply design. We never simply begin anew. The universal is not the pure
extension of humanity, in the sense of ever greater mclusiveness, or an ever
more self-confident affirmation of Humanity in its unity. Nor is it a morally
and intellectually empty exercise in the Will willing itself. Rather, it entails a
spiritually arduous task of conjugating choice and necessity, tradition and
innovation, limits and possibilities. Liberty negates itself when it ig nores its
crucial preconditions. It becomes an exercise in nihilism, a negation more
than an affirmation of freedom. This is the paradox affirmed by the conserva
tive liberalism that rejects the temptation of radical or pure enlightenment.
The nineteenth century French statesman, political theorist, and historian
Francis Guizot, was a preeminent example of such as conservative-minded
liberal. His wisdom still speaks to us today. In his magisterial The History of
Civilization in Europe (1828) he beautifully captured the link between West
ern pluralism and the absence of despotism in western theory and practice.
Near the beginning of that work he writes:
While in other civilizations the exclusive, or at least predominating dominion
of a single principle, of a single form, has been the cause of tyranny, in modern
Europe, the diversity of elements which constitute the social order, the impos
sibility under which they have been placed of excluding each other, have given
birth to the freedom which prevails in the present day.

In that work, Guizot richly displays the "diversity of elements" that have
marked western civilization. The West is "neither narrow, exclusive, nor
stationary"; in it a variety of "forms, ideas, and of principles" struggle and
seek "after a certain unity." Downplaying the Greek origins of the West, he
shows how Rome and Roman law, Christianity, the spontaneity and "love of
independence" of the German tribes, and the bourgeois tradition of civic or
urban freedom, came together to form an essentially plural civilization. Gui
zot does justice to each of these elements: the moral law and human "sponta
neity" are both crucial elements of a freedom worthy of man. He is sensitive
to what is problematic in the willfulness or voluntarism affirmed by much
enlightenment thinking. Against an understanding of freedom that emanci-
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pates the human will from tradition and constraints, Guizot emphasizes the
"sovereignty of Reason," not the rationalism of the French enlightenment but
a trans-historical (and universal) standard of justice that keeps the human
will at bay. He steadfastly opposes the emancipation of the will from its
moorings in a natural and divine order of things. He would never endorse
autonomy or consent as self-contained principles, nor would he approve the
effort to divorce the achievements of the modern West from its roots m an
older Western tradition.
THE TEMPTATION OF CONSERVATIVE MULTICULTURALISM
Today, in contrast, many defenders of the West are tempted to renounce
univer'salism in the name of a conservative version of multiculturahsm. The
West, they argue, is a particular civilization whose distinctive historical ex
perience and long traditions of liberty are not easily replicable by non-West
ern civilizations and cultures. Modernization and globalization offer thin
substitutes for a Western experience rooted in millennial-old traditions o
constitutionalism, civic freedom, and a Christian affirmation of the dignity of
the human person. The Enlightenment's evocation of the "rights of man, no
matter how anti-traditional in emphasis, is dialectically dependent on the
very Christian traditions it tended to reject or, at best, presuppose. The dan
ger is to throw out the baby with the bath, to forget the classical and Christian
foundations of western civilization
Conservative "multiculturalists" such as David Gress and Samuel Hunt
ington are eloquent defenders of a western tradition under assault. They fully
appreciate that the West did not begin with the Enlightenment and is thus
more than a "universalist" project. They are critics of a left-wing multicultu
rahsm that sees in the West an essentially culpable civilization, who see in
the West only a catalogue of historically-unprecedented crimes. Huntington
does not hesitate to speak of a "concentrated and sustained assault" on west
ern civilization by "a small but influential number of intellectuals and publi
cists." These intellectuals and publicists have "attacked the identification of
the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a com
mon American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational
cultural identities and groupings." In this approach, ethnic separatism goes
hand in hand with a romantic vision of the Third World. The Other, in al
its abstraction, is constantly evoked and romanticized. In the words of Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. these same multiculturalists seek "redemptive infusions from
non-Western cultures" whose faults and limits are barely acknowledged.
Little about the West is said to be admirable or choice-worthy. Multiculturallsm might be said to be the ultimate or definitive project for severing any
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remaining links between America—and Western democracy more broadly—
with what is left of Western civilization.
Given Huntington's vehement and articulate critique of multiculturalism
in its dominant form, what right do I have to refer to him as a conservative
multiculturalist? To begin with, for all his defense of Western civilization,
Huntington refuses to acknowledge the universalist dimensions of the West
ern tradition. He affirms less the relativity of cultures and civilizations then
the fact that they are closed in on themselves, rooted in distinct ethnic,
linguistic, and especially religious considerations. The Western way of life
ultimately refers to nothing outside itself. Huntington lacks the philosophical
or "metaphysical" concerns, the German brooding, of an Oswald Spengler.
But like his great German forebear of a century ago, his conception of the
West cannot really ground its distinctiveness in anything other than the spe
cifics—the practices—of our own tradition. Accordingly, Huntington is hesi
tant to acknowledge civilization as such; humanity is said to be divided into
eight or nine civilizations that do not and cannot truly meet.
However, at several points in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remak
ing of World Order, Huntington reluctantly concedes some limited truth to
moral universalism. He acknowledges that "virtually all societies share cer
tain basic values, such as murder is evil, and certain basic institutions, such
as some form of the family." He even concedes the existence of a human
"moral sense," a "'thin' minimal morality of basic concepts of what is right
and wrong." But he is hesitant to admit that this "universal civilization" is
"relevant" to the life of peoples and nations. The sharing in common of a
human moral sense may explain aspects of human behavior, but it cannot
"illuminate or explain history, which consists of changes in human behav
ior." This all-too-summary concession to moral universalism is, in the end,
all Huntington has to say about the universal dimensions of civilization. He is
silent on the fundamental distinction between civilization and barbarism even
if, like all civilized men, he presupposes that distinction.
Huntington is convinced that the era of western dominance of global
affairs is now over. The West's power has irrevocably declined vis-a-vis
other civilizations. Huntington particularly sees a resurgent Islam and China
as posing threats to what is left of Western hegemony in the contemporary
world. For such an astute political observer, there is something strangely
apolitical about his analysis. In the last resort, civilizations don't go to war
with each other. Of course, Huntington acknowledges the continued place of
national conflict and national self-assertion in world affairs. But he is not
clear on the specifically political sources of international conflict. He never
persuasively explains how a resurgent China, for example, is best understood
as a "civilizational" actor rather than a national and political one.
Huntington's advice for statesmen in a multicivilizational world is to
pursue the path of prudence, as he conceives it. "The constructive course," he

44

Daniel J. Mahoney

writes, "is to renounce universal ism, accept diversity, and seek commonal
ities" There is much wisdom in this recommendation. The West, mdeed,
ought to avoid the doctrinaire promotion of democracy, both because author
itarian regimes are sometimes the only available alternative to outright tyran
ny and because the civic traditions of the West cannot be transported abroad
by fiat. He rightly appreciates the limits of the neo-conservative strand in
foreign policy. Nor should we presume that modernization necessarily brings
with it civic freedom and the recognition of the dignity of the human person.
But prudence need not entail a rejection of the universal good that is political
liberty (including basic human rights) or of those features of our own tradi
tion that speak to man as man, not merely to the West in its historic specific
ityThe contemporary West thus has a delicate balancing act before it. It must
not confuse what is "universal" about the West with the thin veneer of
globalization or the sometimes spiritually flaccid pressures of mass, relativistic democracy. It must esteem the best in all high cultures and civilizations.
At the same time, it must not hide from its own superiority in guaranteeing
civic freedom and in realizing the various possibilities of the human soul.
Nor must it deny that the politics, philosophy and religion of the Old West, in
particular, have been powerful means for "mediating" universal values and
principles. We shall return to this theme in the course of our discussion. And
if human rights must be coupled with human obligations as the best western
wisdom has always asserted, it does not mean that the protection of the
individual against the pretensions of a despotic state is not a universal deside
ratum.
Huntington is a worthy critic of "thin" universalism. But he shows no
awareness that universalism, in the most ample sense of the term, is at the
heart of the West: The West, at its best, is always searching to concretize
"universal" human and spiritual principles and experiences. The West re
nounces this kind of universalism only at the price of its soul. In the final
analysis, conservative multicultural ism is a contradiction in terms since the
West cannot be the West if it renounces every form of universalism. Truth be
told, this is a question of political philosophy that can barely be addressed
within the framework of Huntington's "civilizational" analysis. What is
missing in that account is a searching philosophical examination of the con
jugation of the universal and the particular.
LIBERTY AS A CONCRETE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
Let us return to the work of David Gress who shares Samuel Huntington's
anti-universalism, but who has a more profound grasp of the issues at stake in
the debates about the nature of western civilization. The 600 pages of From
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Plato to NATO are an impressive effort to recover the historical concreteness
of western civilization. For Gress, liberty is best understood as a concrete
historical experience rather than an abstract philosophical principle. He at
tacks the "Grand Narrative," as he calls it, that posited a continuous western
tradition beginning in classical antiquity and culminating in the inevitable
triumph of liberal modernity. He opposes a teleological account of western
development that sees the contemporary West—secular, relativistic, and un
sure of itself—as the inevitable culmination of a millennial-old civilization.
Like Huntington, his target is universalism, and again like Huntington, he
makes no distinction between true and false universalism. Above all, he
opposes a humanitarian ideology that confuses the West for the world.
Gress wants to remind his readers that democracy first arose not as the
result of a philosophical project, but rather as "an old practice in the niches of
liberty." Geopolitical pluralism divided power and prevented any person or
entity from becoming "supreme." "This was not done by planning or fore
sight, as in the American constitution." Rather, "it happened by accident,
because the balance of power never allowed a permanent empire to arise." It
"then appeared in hindsight" to theoretical reason "that dividing power was a
condition of liberty." But democracy first arose where centralized power
"could not exercise total control." These "early and partial forms of liberty
gave people incentives to to work, save, and invest without fearing expropri
ation." These "niches of freedom" eventually produced a "new synthesis":
the New West of "political liberty, property rights, and economic develop
ment."
Gress is certainly right that the West is more than modernity, secularism,
and liberalism. He writes movingly about how the original western synthesis
came together and how old warrior virtues were transformed into that form
of Christian honor known as chivalry. The Old West had come together by
the year 1,000. It was in many ways an admirable civilization, and one where
freedom did not entail a "break with the past." By contrast, in the modern
West a qualified skepticism gave way by the late twentieth century to
thoroughgoing nihilism: the essence of the West is now said by the bien
pensants to have no essence at all. To the partisans of late modernity, tradi
tion is regarded as the enemy of culture. Skepticism about religious dogma
tism gave way over time to a more radical denial of human constancy and to
anything resembling the moral law.
Gress is a friend of tradition, but he strangely ignores one part of our
tradition—the heritage of Greek antiquity. He denies that the West began
with the Greeks. Here he simply gets things wrong. For it is clearly the case
that the West began with Greek philosophy and politics even //the West did
not become fully itself until the achievement of the old Western synthesis at
the end of the first millennium. By ignoring the Greeks, he downplays the
central role of reason or philosophy in Western self-understanding (a reason
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that should not be confused with the radical anti-traditionalism of modem
enlightenment thought).
Gress's work is inspired by the undoubted truth that liberty was not, first
and foremost, a "theoretical" insight and achievement. The niches of freedom
in the Old West are, indeed, a precondition for modem liberty. A moderate
enlightenment thinker such as Montesquieu appreciated that freedom
emerged "out of the woods of Germany"—that it was not fundamentally a
theoretical invention. Yet Montesquieu himself theorized modem liberty by
providing a rich phenomenology of modem liberty in the form of his unsur
passed description of the English constitution in books eleven and nineteen
of The Spirit of the Laws. He recognized what is New in the modem synthe
sis even if he did not conceive it as entailing a radical break with the past.
THE DIALECTIC OF THE OLD AND NEW WEST
Gress is equally right that "the New West of democracy, capitalism, and the
scientific method grew out of the Old West symbiosis and cannot survive if it
does not keep its umbilical connection to the past alive." A West that repudi
ates the Old West is no longer the West—it is an essentially post-Western
entity that has lost touch with the profound roots of civilization. Nor is Gress
wrong when he stresses the central place of conflict in the story of liberty.
Liberty is an acquisition that depends on the martial and civic courage of
those who benefit from it. As Churchill wrote so forcefully and eloquently on
the eve of World War II, " (l)t is vain to imagine that the mere perception or
declaration of right principles . . . will be of any value unless they are
supported by those qualities of civic virtue and manly courage—aye, and by
those instruments and agencies of force and science which in the last resort
must be the defense of right and reason." There is no "end to history," no end
to the stmggle to maintain the precious and precarious goods of civilized
order. Great western statesmen such as Winston Churchill and Charles de
Gaulle combined humanity and deep thoughtfulness with a spirited regard for
civilization. Formed by the best of the Old and the New West, they helped
preserve liberal and Christian civilization. We need to cherish their examples
and to imitate them within the limits of our powers.
There is much to be learned from David Gresss's insightful and provoca
tive defense of Western civilization. Yet by so emphasizing the particularity
of the West, he has told only part of the story. He is, to be sure, an eloquent
and scorching critic of debased universal ism. But he does not begin to do
justice to the place of the universal in Western self-understanding.
The work of Pierre Manent provides a penetrating corrective to the antiuniversalism of the conservative multiculturalists. Like them, he vigorously
defends the "plural" character of the West and opposes its reduction to the
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abstractions of enlightenment rationalism. He, too, knows that the New West
is dialectically dependent upon an Old West it is tempted to consign to the
dustbm of history. But Manent refuses to jettison the quest for the universal
that gives life and force to Western civilization. Affirming both plurality and
universality, his is a political approach informed by philosophical and theo
logical reflection and grounded in the historical experience of the West.
Manent does not go so far as to identify the West with Civilization itself. He
acknowledges that there are vibrant non-Western civilizations which are
worthy of our respect and which, in their own way, mediate the human
experience of the universal.
THE (QUALIFIED) SUPERIORITY OF THE WEST
But Manent does not hesitate to speak of a certain "superiority" of the West.
This superiority is rooted in the fact that "our civilization's exploration of
human possibilities is more complete than other civilizations." Beginning
with the Greek city, the West learned to produce "something in common"—
to put "reasons and actions in common" through the cooperative and agonis
tic enterprise which is free political life. The City was the first home of
human self-government. In the classical experience of civic life, truth and
community were conjugated in a manner that was specific to the West.
Community or the common good was concrete or bounded, located within
the contours of "the most narrowly unified community possible." For its part,
Truth "tends to merge with 'the universal,' and therefore to spill over the
bounds of every given community." The West is the civilization par excel
lence that aims to mediate the universal. The city, the Church, and the nation
each gave concrete expression to the universal and prevented it from becom
ing lost in abstraction or in an ethereal realm inaccessible to mere mortals.
The "dialectic between community and truth or universality gives movement
and rhythm to the history of the West." This dialectic is effaced by a contem
porary religion of humanity that aims to abolish it and that replaces the
mediations that give us access to the universal with an empty appeal to
human self-assertion, if not self-deification. Both truth and community are
victims of an abstract humanitarianism that no longer poses the question of
man (that would assume that truth is a meaningful proposition) or allows
human beings to put things in common as opposed to asserting the triumph of
Humanity over all those mediations which, in fact, bring together and vivify
the concrete and the universal. Endless Extension of our humanity ("We are
the World") wins out over a recognition of Transcendence, and a thin or faux
universality substitutes for the real thing.
Contemporary humanitarianism is undoubtedly a vehicle for inculcating
"fellow feeling." But it is far from a "political resource." "It concerns an
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immediate humanity indifferently encompassing 'all people' and 'everyone,'
that offers no resource whatever for mediation." One of the problems with
the conservative anti-universalism of Huntington and Gress is that neither
can adequately distinguish the humanitarian substitution for—and subversion
of—the universal from the dialectic of truth and community that was the
lifeblood of the Old West. Hence, their deeply problematic suggestion that
the West jettison universality, that it understand itself merely as one co-equal
civilization among many. In this way, paradoxically they succumb to the
very categories of late modernity that they ostensibly reject.
THE MEDIATION OF THE UNIVERSAL
What is needed is a spiritual and intellectual restoration of a "science of
mediation." No more than Athens does Jerusalem represent pure particular
ity. Israel, the other profound spiritual source of the Western soul, is, in
Jewish self-understanding, "the mediator between humanity and its creator."
Israel's election is not a victory for particularity, as Spinoza suggested in bad
faith. To the contrary, "Israel's election creates a covenant between God and
human beings for the benefit of all humanity." Likewise, the nation is more
than a particular political form. It was, above all, the mediator of "the two
great universals that Europe has known: the Church's and humanity's."
Whether under Christian kingship or the democratic proposition, the nation
was a "concrete universal" that allowed truth and community to coexist and
even flourish. It incarnated the Western aspiration to the universal by giving
it a body or concrete form. As Manent makes clear in The Metamorphoses of
the City and Seeing Things Politically, the distinctive energy of the West is
tied to the never-ending "mediation of the universal." Thus, the West can
renounce universality—or replace it with the pseudo-universalism of humanitarianism and unthinking cosmopolitanism—only at the cost of its soul.
The (qualified) superiority of the West is tied to its invention of the
political city (which unleashed tremendous energy and the very possibility of
"putting things in common") and its discovery of the soul, the great synthetic
principle of human life. The soul is not a poetic metaphor but rather the very
source of human integration and self-consciousness. As Manent points out,
the soul was above all a discovery of philosophy, and not of religion as is
commonly presupposed. Indeed, Western history "is constituted by the effort
to deploy these possibilities of the soul as completely as possible." The
greatest of these possibilities may be conversion, which is predicated on the
"possibility of becoming completely different while staying the same." Con
version—whether philosophical or religious—recognizes the soul's capacity
to change and to respond to the calling of truth while staying the same. "It
takes great confidence in the soul... to take up this adventure," to respond to
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the invitation to begin anew. Some religions such as Islam denounce conver
sion as apostasy, not simply because they are hide-bound prisoners of an
obtuse orthopraxy, but also because they do not recognize conversion as a
real human possibility. Conversion is thus "forbidden" because it is under
stood to be "impossible." The West, in contrast, did not have to wait until the
Enlightenment to free itself from the tyranny of "received customs and exter
nal circumstances." This was inherent in the capacious sense of the soul's
possibilities that is coextensive with Western civilization itself.
For Manent, the West kept the question of man alive in an unsurpassed
manner. Having invented politics and discovered the fullest possibilities of
the human soul, it can lay a claim to embodying civilization as such. But
today humanitarian democracy wants to say good-bye to the "mediation of
mediations" which is national political life.
Contemporary Europe is under the thrall of the twin temptations of deChristianization and de-politicization. The European Union "blends with hu
manity" and repudiates the age-old European quest for the "concrete univer
sal." It is not political, it no longer mediates. It satisfies itself with indefinite
territorial extension (the six nations have become twenty-seven, with no end
in principle) and a soft, moralistic identification with the cause of Humanity.
This religion of humanity, founded by August Comte 175 years ago and for
all intents and purposes now established as the new religion of a post-politi
cal, post-religious Europe, gets in the way of Europe's defining quest. Block
ing an authentically political community from being formed, it also "prevents
the question of humanity from being posed." It thus presages what can only
be called the death of the West. Manent's sobering analysis is, however, far
from an invitation to despair. He wants the West to recover the full possibil
ities of the soul: to take the question of truth and community as seriously as
our great forebears, to open ourselves to the adventure of conversion. Far
from jettisoning universality, we must rejuvenate the science of mediation
that is the West's unique contribution to human and political self-understand
ing.
It is precisely the mediation of the universal and the particular that defines
the adventure of the West. The conservative critics of universalism rightly
want to defend the integrity of the West. But they fail to appreciate that
universality, the binding together of truth and community, is the engine of
the West's prodigious development. They rightly oppose the contemporary
religion of humanity, but do so at the expense of the dialectic that gives life
to the West. One thing is clear: a true dialogue of cultures and civilizations
can only commence when the question of humanity is raised intelligently and
forthrightly. We must respect the spiritual integrity of non-western civiliza
tions without succumbing to a facile and self-destructive relativism. At the
same time, we must avoid the Scylla of humanitarianism, with its facile
identification of the universal with endless extension, and the Charybdis of
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multiculturalism, which fails to do justice to the reality of Civilization itself.
In doing justice to the "concrete universal" which is the West, we must not be
afraid to bow before a Truth which is not culture-specific and that ultimately
belongs to man as man.
SOURCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
For the theological and philosophical grounds of Pope Benedict XVI's evo
cation of the "dialogue of cultures and civilizations" see the speeches col
lected in Marc D. Guerra, ed., Liberating Logos: Pope Benedict's September
Speeches, Preface by James V. Schall (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's
Press, 2014).
For a particularly rich treatment of the limits of social contract theorizing
as well as of the "territorial" character of Western political loyalties, see
Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist
Threat (ISI Books: Wilmmgton, DE: 2002).
Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1996) admirably addresses ques
tions of contemporary global politics. For Huntington's problematic reflec
tions on the commonalities of civilizations and the limits of universalism, see
p. 56 and pp. 318-320.
Francois Guizot's The History of Civilization in Europe (originally pub
lished in French in 1828) is the best general account of European political
development that I know of. See the 2013 re-edition of William Hazlitt's
1846 translation (with an Introduction by Larry Siedentrop) released by Lib
erty Fund in an elegant paperback edition. The discussion of the Old West's
distinctive aversion to a single tyrannical principle can be found on pp.
33-34.
I have drawn on the full breadth of David Gress's magisterial From Plato
to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents (New York: Free Press,
1998) as well as the five-page executive summary of the book, "The Idea of
the West," published in Foreign Policy in Focus, vol. l,No. 5, August 1998.
For Pierre Manent's critique of the tyrannical character of a notion of
consent that recognizes no preconditions or limits, see Manent, Democracy
Without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in Europe, translated by Paul
Seaton (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), especially pp. 83-84. The bulk
of my discussion of Pierre Manent's work draws on the final chapter ("What
is the West?) of Seeing Things Politically: Interviews with Benedicte Delorme-Montini, translated by Ralph C. Hancock with an Introduction by Dan
iel J. Mahoney (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2015). See also the
philosophically profound discussion of "mediation" in the final chapter
("The Stakes of Mediation") of Manent, Metamorphoses of the City: On the

One Civilization among Many?

51

Western Dynamic, translated by Marc LePain (Cambridge, MA and London,
England: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 304-327.
Winston Churchill is the preeminent example of a statesman who vigor
ously defended civilization while thoughtfully reflecting on its nature and
prerequisites. His most complete and satisfying reflection on the meaning of
civilization can be found in a speech ("Civilization") that he delivered at the
University of Bristol on July 2, 1938. See Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), pp. 45-46.
Any reflection on the relationship of the universal and particular must
come to grips with classical philosophy, especially but not only the indis
pensable moral and political writings of Aristotle. For a modern effort to
blend the particular character of the "spirit of the laws" with a universalist
rejection of despotism, see that great work of modern prudence that is Mon
tesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws. See also Tocqueville's unsurpassed reflec
tion in vol. II of Democracy in America on the distinction between—and
necessary interpenetration of—the old and new dispensations he calls "aris
tocracy" and "democracy."

